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Abstract 
We investigate within-family inequalities in human capital accumulation in India. We consider 
both indicators of the child's current stock of human capital and of investment into their continued 
human capital accumulation, distinguishing between time investments and pecuniary investment 
into school quality. We develop a theoretical framework that demonstrates how credit constraints 
and opportunity cost of child time matter differently for time investments and pecuniary 
investments into human capital. We employ a within family model using sibship fixed effects, and 
find mostly negative birth order effects, i.e. earlier born children are better off. This is more in line 
with previous results from developed countries rather than from developing countries. However, 
for time investments, which are influenced by the opportunity cost of child time, birth order effects 
are more in line with what has previously been found in developing countries. Hence, we 
demonstrate that patterns of birth order effects differ by measure of human capital.  
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1. Introduction 
Human capital formation has long been considered a central component in explaining economic 
development and economic inequalities. Much of the early research on human capital formation 
tended to emphasize the household as the primary unit of analysis, and focused on differences 
between households in order to explain variations in outcomes. More recently, however, within-
household inequalities in human capital formation have gained greater attention. One aspect of 
within-household inequality that has proven significant is birth order, as educational outcomes 
have repeatedly been shown to differ systematically along this dimension. There is an extensive 
literature showing negative birth order effects on human capital in developed countries, i.e. 
first-born siblings fare best. The literature from developing countries is much smaller, but 
suggests the opposite relationship. Later-born children tend to have better educational outcomes 
(Ejrnæs and Pörtner, 2004; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al, 2014).  
In this paper we investigate birth order effects on the development of children’s human capital 
in India. Our data on education inputs and outcomes is unusually rich, allowing us to investigate 
both indicators of the child’s current stock of human capital and of investment into their 
continued human capital accumulation. We can further distinguish between time investments 
and pecuniary investment into school quality. We also examine the impact of birth order on 
child labor. While not an educational variable per se, child labor is relevant in understanding 
educational human capital accumulation.  
Higher birth order children are found in larger families. An analysis of birth order effects thus 
has to address the close relation between birth order and family size. To control for family size 
and other differences across families, we employ a within family model using sibship (i.e. 
groups of full siblings) fixed effects. Following Black et al. (2005), we also estimate separate 
regressions for each sibship size (still with sibship fixed effects, since families can differ in 
other important ways than family size). While within-family models are standard in the large 
literature on birth order effects from developed countries, and used in some of the best 
developing country studies, it has not been used in earlier studies from India. A within 
household analysis is the only way to completely avoid confounding birth order effects with 
systematic differences between families. This is especially important in the Indian context 
where we can expect systematic relationships between gender, birth order and family size.  
In India, girls tend to live in larger families on average. This is because of gender-specific 
fertility stopping rules, i.e. parents that continue having children until they get a son (Jensen, 
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2003). Furthermore, there is a systematic relationship between birth order and gender within 
(some) families, due to sex-selective abortions, which is more common at higher birth orders 
when fertility approaches or exceeds parents’ desired fertility (Basu, 1999; Rosenblum, 2013; 
Pörtner, 2013). To estimate causal effects of birth order on human capital accumulation 
outcomes the child gender control is therefore essential. Similarly, an estimation of gender 
effects has to control for birth order and family size. We further investigate if birth order effects 
vary systematically by gender by including a model where birth order is interacted with gender. 
Our results show that birth order effects are mostly negative in India. This is more in line with 
the findings in developed countries than with those in developing countries. First-born children 
more often attend a private school, and their families spend more on their education. They have 
completed more grades, and they perform better on reading, writing and math tests. The 
exception to this pattern is the results for time investment indicators, which are more similar to 
the typical developing country pattern. Birth order effects are similar for girls and for boys. 
Having established negative birth order effects, we attempt to reconcile these results with 
positive birth order effects in other developing countries. The suggested explanation behind 
positive birth order effects in earlier papers from developing countries is resource constraints 
combined with increasing family income over time, in particular if older siblings can contribute 
to household income (Parish and Willis, 1993; Sawada and Lokshin, 2009). Morevoer, the 
previous literature has mostly estimated effects on time investment indicators, though 
completed grades has also been used. We include a much wider range of indicators of both 
investment into human capital accumulation and the current human capital stock. A simple 
model highlights that credit constraints matter for both time investment and pecuniary 
investment, but that time investment is also affected by the opportunity cost of child time (in 
particular the interaction between credit constraints and opportunity costs of child time). As 
mentioned, our results for time investment indicators indeed show a similar pattern as in the 
previous literature from developing countries. Birth order effects on child labor are negative, 
and birth order effects on enrollment and school hours are positive in large families. This 
suggests that opportunity cost of child time matters for human capital investment decisions, but 
that credit constraints alone are less important to explain within-family differences.  
Similar to previous studies from developing countries we investigate the general importance of 
credit constraints for birth order effects by estimating heterogeneity of birth order effects with 
respect to income. Our results suggest that credit constraints and poverty only matter in the case 
4 
 
of time investments. Again, this speaks for shifting focus from credit constraints in general 
towards opportunity costs of child time as an explanation behind positive birth order effects in 
poor families. We also estimate birth order effects in a sample where both credit constraints and 
opportunity cost of child time should be most important: poor rural households. Even in these 
families, birth order effects are mostly negative.  
Our results also indicate that girls are disadvantaged within families, both with regard to 
investment into their human capital accumulation and with regard to the human capital stock 
that they possess. The one exception where girls do not appear to be disadvantaged is with 
regard to completed grades. This is despite the fact they are disadvantaged with regard to school 
enrollment as well as hours spent on schooling, and thus suggests that girls might be better 
provided with some ability of importance for academic success. Girls are not equally 
disadvantaged in all families: they are less so in small families and in rich families. This 
disadvantage is not driven by differential birth order effects. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Foremost, we contribute to the 
small but growing literature on birth order effects on education in developing countries. In 
addition to using the most convincing empirical strategy (family fixed effects), we employ a 
wider range of measures of human capital compared to most of the existing literature, including 
both measures of children’s human capital stock and of different forms of education investment.  
This allows for a more nuanced picture of the relationship between birth order and human 
capital development. We can thus shed further light on both the extent to which birth order 
effects in developing countries differ from those in developed countries, and on the reasons 
behind such differences. In particular, we show that birth order effects are not always positive 
in developing countries, and that they might differ depending on the type of education indicator. 
Positive birth order effects are more likely for time investment, since these are influenced by 
the opportunity cost of child time. They are less likely for indicators of pecuniary investments 
into school quality or for indicators of children’s accumulated human capital stock. Ours is the 
first study to point out that credit constraints are likely to matter differently for time investment 
compared to pecuniary investment. 
An additional contribution is that this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that 
investigates the effect of birth order on educational attainment in India using only within family 
variation. This is particularly important in the Indian context where family size is systematically 
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related not only to birth order but also to gender. Prior studies on birth order effects in India 
have employed different methods and come to conflicting results.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous research, 
section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, section 4 presents the data, variables and the 
empirical model, while section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 investigates the role of 
credit constraints, and section 7 discusses and concludes the paper. 
2. Review of previous research 
Empirical findings on birth order effects  
A large body of literature uses within family variation to find causal effects of birth order in 
developed countries. These studies consistently show a negative birth order effect. Earlier born 
children have on average higher educational attainment and perform better on various tests of 
ability (Black et al, 2005; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2006; Booth 
and Kee, 2009; De Haan, 2010; Silles, 2010; Hotz and Pantano, 2015). There has been less 
investigation into the effect of birth order on educational outcomes in developing countries. The 
existing literature has found positive birth order effects in the Philippines (Ejrnæs and Pörtner, 
2004), Ecuador (De Haan et al, 2014), Bolivia (Zeng et al, 2012), sub-Saharan Africa (Tenikue 
and Verheyden, 2010), Nicaragua and Guatemala (Dammert, 2010), and Ethiopia (Lindskog, 
2013). This is the opposite relationship as compared to the results in high income countries. 
However, in the cases where the above studies have split the sample between relatively rich and 
relatively poor households, the results in the relatively rich households are weak or even 
reversed, with a negative relationship between birth order and education outcomes. 
While the majority of studies have found a monotonous relationship between birth order and 
education, there are a few exceptions. Dayioğlu et al (2009) find a non-monotonous relationship 
between birth order and school attendance in urban Turkey, while Sanhueza (2009) finds a non-
monotonous relationship between birth order and years of schooling in Chile. In both cases, 
middle born children appear to fare worse than both their older and their younger siblings. 
There are two studies of birth order effects on education outcomes in India. These studies come 
to conflicting conclusions. Makino (2018) investigates the relationship between birth order and 
test scores.  She finds that there are no birth order effects for girls, while there are significant 
negative birth order effects for boys with older brothers. Her main strategy to deal with the 
correlation between birth order and family size is to estimate separate regressions for each 
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family size. Since family size is probably the most important difference between families 
having children of different birth orders, she uses the between-family variation to identify birth 
order effects for given (so far realized) family sizes. She performs some within-household 
regressions, but her data include few families with more than one sibling in the relevant age 
group.  Kumar (2016) investigates the relationship between birth order and years of schooling. 
His results show significant positive birth order effects. He controls for family size and uses 
gender of the first-born as an instrument. However, the gender of siblings might have an 
independent effect on educational outcomes in India. Hence, it remains unclear if it is in fact 
birth order effects that drive his results. Therefore, the effect of birth order on educational 
outcomes in India remains an open question. 
Suggested pathways through which birth order could affect schooling 
In developing countries, birth order effects on human capital accumulation have generally been 
found to be positive. One hypothesis is that credit constraints can explain this positive 
relationship. Families facing a credit constraint will be unable to fully equalize the amount of 
resources allocated to each child. They may therefore be more likely to have their early-born 
children participate in labor or child care and less likely to participate in education (Lafortune 
and Lee, 2014). Later-born children thus benefit from the extra income generated by their older 
siblings. They also benefit from the fact that household income tends to increase over time 
(Parish and Willis, 1993).  
As an example, Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) develop a dynamic model of household 
consumption where birth order effects can either be negative or positive. Under the assumptions 
of imperfect credit markets and ascending altruism (i.e. children are altruistic towards their 
parents), the model concludes that parents will invest more in the education of their first born 
child when they are not faced with credit constraints, but that in the face of binding credit 
constraints the first child will face higher pressure to work. They test their model empirically 
on data from twelve sub-Saharan African countries and find that the predictions of the model 
hold; relatively rich households exhibit negative birth order effects while relatively poor 
households exhibit positive effects. Similarly, De Haan et al (2014) examine birth order effects 
on education and child labor in Ecuador and find positive average birth order effects. When  
they interact birth order with a household poverty index on the one hand and education of the 
household head on the other, they find that relatively rich households and households where the 
head has relatively high education have significantly more negative birth order effects. 
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Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004) present an alternative explanation to positive birth order effect. In 
their endogenous fertility model, parents employ a fertility stopping rule dependent on the 
endowment of their children, meaning they stop having children once a child with a sufficiently 
high endowment is born. Further, parents choose to reinforce rather than compensate 
differences between children via investments in human capital. These strategies lead to positive 
birth order effects, as last-born children will be the children with the highest endowments and 
thus receive the most human capital investment. This also leads to systematic differences in 
family size, as families where high endowment children enter at a low birth order will have 
fewer children. 
Several theories address the negative relationship between birth order and educational 
attainment that has been found in developed countries. One hypothesis is that biological factors 
drive the observed relationship. The general argument is that earlier born children are healthier 
for reasons relating to mothers’ health and behavior during pregnancy. Empirical results on this 
theory tend to conflict.1 Furthermore, Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2010) find that IQ scores of 
Norwegian military conscripts are dependent on the individuals’ social rank within the family, 
not strict biological birth order. Similarly, Barclay (2015) finds a negative birth order effect in 
a sample restricted to families where all siblings are adopted. This indicates that biological 
factors do not play a key role, thus the biological view does not seem to be the most relevant.  
A model that is more in line with the results found in Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2010) and 
Barclay (2015) is the confluence model, which posits that the intellectual environment within 
the family is crucial for the intellectual development of children (Zajonc and Markus, 1975; 
Zajonc, 1976; Zajonc et al. 1979). The intellectual environment, in turn, is modelled as a 
weighted average of the parents’ and children’s intelligence. Since each child added to the 
family enters into a lower intellectual environment compared to the previous child, there are 
negative birth order effects.  
Another postulated explanation for negative birth order effects is the resource dilution 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is similar to the confluence model, but in this case the important 
inputs to child development are parents’ time and material resources. As family size increases, 
there will be less time and money per child. First-born children will therefore have the 
                                                          
1 Lehmann et al (2018, JHR) find for example that mothers reduce their cigarette consumption less with later-
born children. In contrast, Black et al (2011) in a study on birth order and IQ in Norway find that early born 
children have, if anything, a slight disadvantage at birth. 
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advantage of relatively more parental resources, at least during the period when they are the 
only child. The advantage faced by earlier born children is exacerbated by the fact that early-
life investments in human capital have a persistent positive impact on educational outcomes. It 
also increases the productivity of future investments (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).  
3. Theoretical framework  
In this section we sketch a theoretical framework for current human capital stock and 
investment into continued human capital accumulation. This serves to guide the structure and 
interpretation of our empirical results. Starting with the human capital stock, there is now 
compelling evidence of the importance of early life investment and complementarities between 
early and late childhood. Hence, we use the human capital production function in Cunha and 
Heckman (2007) as our point of departure.  
Human capital, in the form of different cognitive and non-cognitive skills and abilities, depends 
on parental characteristics, initial endowments and investments. Formally, human capital of 
sibling i in the next period ℎ𝑡+1,𝑖 is a function of home environment, 𝜔, current human capital, 
ℎ𝑡,𝑖, and various investments, 𝐼𝑡,𝑖 :   ℎ𝑡+1,𝑖 = 𝑓( 𝜔, ℎ𝑡,𝑖, 𝐼𝑡,𝑖 ). Home environment includes 
sibling interactions, implying that 𝜔 differs across siblings. 
The current stock of human capital, which is what we estimate empirically, is the outcome of 
initial endowments of the child, home environment, and all prior investments in the child’s 
human capital; 
(1)  ℎ𝜏,𝑖 = 𝑓( 𝜔𝑖, ℎ0,𝑖, 𝐼𝑡𝜖(0,𝜏),𝑖 ).  
We do not observe the arguments of the human capital production function, but estimate the 
reduced form effects of birth order and gender. While, as has been demonstrated by the 
empirical literature from developed countries, there are no reasons to expect that initial 
endowments ℎ0,𝑖 should differ systematically with gender or birth order, 𝜔𝑖 will differ by birth 
order if it includes sibling interaction. Earlier investments 𝐼𝑡𝜖(0,𝜏),𝑖 might vary with both birth 
order and gender. Note that current human capital could be viewed both as the outcome of 
human capital formation up until data collection and as arguments in the human capital 
production function. 
Next, to arrive at an expression for education investment, we assume the simplest possible 
model. There are two periods: the current (late childhood of the children) and the future (when 
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the children are grown-up). Parents invest in children’s human capital in the current period to 
maximize the sum of their utility over the two periods. Parents receive utility from household 
consumption in the current period, 𝑐1, and from household consumption and grown-up 
children’s human capital in the next period, 𝑐2 and ℎ2,𝑖. We abstract from discount rates and 
interest rates to simplify. Parents’ utility function is 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐1) + 𝑢(𝑐2, 𝜃𝑖ℎ2,𝑖). The 𝜃:s are the 
value to parents of grown-up children’s human capital, and can vary across children. It can be 
thought of as including both altruism and different types of transfers to the parents.2 The human 
capital production function of each child is ℎ2,𝑖 = 𝑓( 𝜔𝑖, ℎ2,𝑖, 𝐼𝑗,𝑖 ). Parents maximize total 
expected utility subject to the human capital production functions of their children and subject 
to the current and future period budget constraints. The current period budget constraint is 𝑦1
𝑝 +
∑ 𝑦1,𝑖 =𝑖 𝑐1 + ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐼𝑖,𝑗𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑠, where parents’ income, 𝑦1
𝑝, is given, but where child income, 𝑦1,𝑖, 
depends on child labor, and thereby on the time they invest in education. Let 𝑤𝑖 be the child 
wage rate. Then 𝑦1,𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑗) for time investments. Further, 𝑝𝑗 is the pecuniary cost of 
investment j, and s is savings. The future period budget constraint is 𝑦2
𝑝 + 𝑠 = 𝑐2. Substitution 
of constraints into the utility function and maximization with respect to human capital 
investments gives the following first order condition for time investments and pecuniary 
investment into school quality respectively: 
(2)  𝜃𝑠
𝛿𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑗
=
𝛿𝑢(∙)
𝛿𝑐1
(𝑤𝑠 + 𝑝𝑗),  
(3) 𝜃
𝛿𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑗
=
𝛿𝑢(∙)
𝛿𝑐1
𝑝𝑗,  
where the left hand side is the parents’ marginal benefit of investment j for child i and the right 
hand side is the marginal cost of that investment. The marginal benefit increases with 
𝜃𝑖 , parents’ valuation of increased human capital for child i, and with 
𝛿𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑗
 , the marginal 
productivity of  investment j in increasing child i’s human capital. If, as in the model of Cunha 
and Heckman, we assume that 
𝛿2𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝐼𝛿ℎ
> 0, then an investment will increase human capital more 
among children who already possess higher human capital, creating an equality-efficiency 
trade-off. Turning to the marginal cost of investment j, it increases with 𝑝𝑗 , the pecuniary cost, 
and, for time investments, 𝑤𝑖, the opportunity cost of child time. The impact of these costs on 
                                                          
2 Transfers to parents could have been modeled as part of future period income instead, but we prefer to keep it 
as simple as possible. 
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parents’ marginal utility also increases with 
𝛿𝑢(∙)
𝛿𝑐1
, the marginal utility of increased current period 
consumption. This term is higher among credit constrained households, creating a downward 
pressure on educational investment in these families.  
Again, we estimate the reduced form effects of birth order and gender. With the exception of 
𝑝𝑗, all other terms can differ with birth order and gender. Parents’ valuation of child human 
capital, 𝜃𝑖 , can differ either because of differential degrees of altruism, or because children are 
expected to contribute differently to parents in their old age. The marginal productivity of the 
investment,  
𝛿𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑗,
 , differs if the current human capital stock differs. The marginal utility of 
current period consumption, 
𝛿𝑢(∙)
𝛿𝑐1
,  differs with birth order if the family is credit constrained and 
family income, as has been suggested, increases over time. The marginal cost depends on the 
interaction between the marginal utility of current period consumption and the opportunity cost 
and the pecuniary cost respectively. Edmonds (2006) shows that children of different birth order 
and gender have different comparative advantages, with older children more productive in child 
labor. While younger siblings should be equally productive when they reach a certain age, this 
will influence their educational investments less if the family is by then less credit constrained. 
Depending on context, there might also be differences in returns to child labor between boys 
and girls. 
 
4. Data, variables and empirical model 
Data 
Our data comes from the 2004 - 05 and 2011 - 12 rounds of the India Human Development 
Survey (IHDS). This is a nationally representative survey of 42152 households covering 1420 
villages and 1042 urban neighborhoods in India. The data has been collected as part of a joint 
project between the University of Maryland in the United States and the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research in India. The surveys were administered via interviews conducted 
in the local language, and cover a wide variety of socioeconomic topics. We have information 
that links each child to their mother. In order to determine the birth order of a child, we make 
use of the eligible women file. This includes the birth history of all women in the sample 
between the ages 15 and 49. We restrict the sample to cases where both the mothers and their 
husbands have not been previously married, creating a sample of full siblings (i.e. without half 
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siblings or step-siblings).3 As there are cases where extended families are living in one 
household, we observe cases where there is more than one sibship per household. We exclude 
multiple birth children (twins, triplets), since their birth order is not well-defined. For the sake 
of our analysis, we further restrict our sub-sample to families where the sibship size is between 
2 and 6.4  
The estimation sample differs across different dependent variables. Test scores are only 
available for children age 8-11, but all other dependent variables are estimated on children aged 
6 to 17. Since we are using a within-family model, there needs to be non-missing data from at 
least two children in a sibship for it to be included in the estimation sample. Often there is data 
on more than one child from each of the two surveys. Sibships are also included if there is data 
from one child in 2004-05 and another child in 2011-12. This substantially increases the test 
scores estimation sample.   
Variables 
Our main explanatory variable is absolute birth order. We construct dummy variables for birth 
orders one, two, three and four plus, the last of which takes a value of one if the child’s birth 
order is 4, 5 or 6 and zero otherwise. A particular strength of the data set is that it includes an 
unusually rich set of educational information. As mentioned earlier, our dependent variables 
can be categorized into indicators of the child’s current human capital stock and investments 
into the child’s continued human capital accumulation. The indicators of current human capital 
are the scores on reading, writing and mathematics tests and the number of completed grades.   
Cunha and Heckman (2008) show that test scores are not only influenced by cognitive, but also 
non-cognitive skills. The same is likely to hold for completed grades. In our regressions we use 
standardized test scores5 - on tests administered by the interviewer as part of the survey - and 
number of completed grades, such that they measure age-specific standard deviations from the 
mean, using the sample population as the age-specific reference.6  
                                                          
3 Divorce is very unusual in India, and only 3.9% of children have one or two previously married parents.  
4 We exclude larger families, since they are not common, and since we do not want unusual families to drive the 
high birth order results. Families that have 7 or more children make up 2.15% of the original sample.  
5 The test scores variables are the same as Makino (2018) uses in her analysis. We have an additional round of 
data from 2010-11 and thus have a much larger sample of families with at least two children in the data. This 
allows us to rely on a within-sibship analysis. 
6 The reading score runs from 0 (cannot read) to 4 (read a story), with the intermediate values 1 (letter), 2 (word) 
and 3 (paragraph). The writing score is equal to 0 if the child cannot write and 1 if the child can write with 2 or 
less mistakes. The math score runs between 0 (cannot count) and 3 (division), with the intermediate values 1 
(number) and 2 (subtraction). 
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Our indicators of investments are enrollment, child labor, total hours, private school and 
expenses. The first three are indicators of time invested in schooling, where the total hours most 
directly corresponds to what we intend to measure.7 Though not an educational variable, the 
information on child labor is relevant since it represents an alternative use of child time. Child 
labor is also studied in much of the earlier literature from developing countries. As has been 
conventional we will interpret child labor as the opposite of investing in child human capital. It 
is, however, possible that child labor is an investment into human capital. In particular among 
rural oldest sons who are likely to inherit the family land, learning by doing at the field can be 
an investment into his human capital (Congdon Fors et al., 2015; Lindskog, 2017; Fernando, 
2016; Kosec et al., 2017). Enrollment, and child labor are dummy variables taking a value of 1 
if the child is enrolled in school or works more than 240 hours a year,8 respectively, and zero 
otherwise. Total hours combines the hours of school, hours of homework and hours of private 
tuition per week used by the child.9 Though total hours is only collected for children who are 
enrolled, we set it to zero for all children who are not enrolled and estimate it on the full sample. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Enrollment 66,095 0.869 0.338 0.000 1.000 
Child labor 66,164 0.083 0.276 0.000 1.000 
Total hours spent on school in a week 59,732 36.787 19.147 0.000 216.000 
Private school 53,516 0.299 0.458 0.000 1.000 
School expenses in rupees 48,284 3146.792 6057.788 0.000 201000 
Completed grades 66,086 4.739 3.202 0.000 16.000 
Reading test score 7,871 2.546 1.367 0.000 4.000 
Writing test score 7,787 0.708 0.455 0.000 1.000 
Math test score 7,849 1.496 1.003 0.000 3.000 
Explanatory variables (enrollment sample)     
Birth order 1 66,095 0.288 0.453 0.000 1.000 
Birth order 2 66,095 0.338 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Birth order 3 66,095 0.212 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Birth order 4 to 6 66,095 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
Age 7 66,095 0.084 0.278 0.000 1.000 
Age 8 66,095 0.076 0.266 0.000 1.000 
Age 9 66,095 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000 
                                                          
7 While it is possible that children are enrolled without actually attending school, less than 1% of our enrolled 
sample report spending zero hours on schooling, and approximately 90% report spending at least 29 hours a 
week on schooling. 
8 The 240 hours a year cut-off is from the data, which does not include the continuous hours worked in both 
surveys.  
9 Private tuition depends on pecuniary investment, but we still choose to include it to count all hours equally. If 
children did not study with private tutors they could instead study alone or with someone else.  
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Age 10 66,095 0.103 0.304 0.000 1.000 
Age 11 66,095 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000 
Age 12 66,095 0.118 0.323 0.000 1.000 
Age 13 66,095 0.091 0.287 0.000 1.000 
Age 14 66,095 0.095 0.293 0.000 1.000 
Age 15 66,095 0.080 0.271 0.000 1.000 
Age 16 66,095 0.070 0.256 0.000 1.000 
Age 17 66,095 0.062 0.256 0.000 1.000 
Girl 66,095 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Year 2011 66,095 0.468 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Income per capita in 100,000 rupees 65,177 0.151 0.180 0.000 1.500 
Poor 66,088 0.252 0.434 0.000 1.000 
Urban 66,095 0.314 0.464 0.000 1.000 
 
Private schooling and school expenses are indicators of investment into school quality.10 
Private school and Expenses is also collected only for children who are enrolled in school, and 
in the main estimations we estimate them on the conditional samples. Thus the estimation 
samples for these outcomes are endogenous. 11 We run robustness estimations were we have 
coded the expenses and the private school attendance as zero for all children who are not 
enrolled in school, but prefer to keep the estimations based on the conditional samples in the 
main analysis since they are easier to interpret. Private school is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the child attends a private school, and 0 if the child attends a public school. 
Expenses measures the cost of school fees, books, uniforms, bus fare and private tuition fees in 
rupees.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on all variables used in our analysis.12 Enrolment is rather 
high, at 86.9% and child labor rather low, at 8.3%. Note, however that children have to work at 
least four hours a week to be considered as child laborers, and that household chores (which we 
do not have information on) are not counted as work.  
Empirical model 
We are interested in within-household inequalities in human capital formation. Are there any 
systematic inequalities related to birth order? By necessity birth order is correlated with family 
                                                          
10 Though the effect of these investments on human capital accumulation remain unclear, parents are likely to 
make them with the intent to improve the child’s human capital.  
11 Note that this, for example, implies that a family is dropped if only one child has attended school, even if there 
are more children of the right ages in the data. However, these families are included in the robustness estimations 
on the unconditional sample.  
12 Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables by sibship size. 
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size, and in India gender has also been shown to be so (Jensen, 2003). We use sibship fixed 
effects13 (where siblings in a sibship have the same mother and father) in order to ensure that 
we do not confuse within-family inequalities with differences in human capital accumulation 
across families, which depend for example on family size and the systematic relationship 
between family size, gender and birth order. Furthermore, since gender is not completely 
exogenous in India, but systematically related to birth order, it is essential to control for gender 
to estimate causal birth order effects.  
In addition to sibship fixed effects and the female control, we control for a full set of age 
dummies and survey round. The basic model is 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟2𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟3𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟4𝑡𝑜6𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠 + ∑ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡𝜋 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡, the outcome of child i in sibship s at time t, are our measures of children’s current 
human capital stock and of investment into their continued human capital accumulation. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
is a full set of child age dummies, and 𝜑𝑡 is  a survey round dummy controlling for, among 
other things, the expansion of schooling over time.  𝛾𝑠 are sibship fixed effects, which captures 
differences in family size, and all other time constant differences across families.  
Even if only within family variation is used for identification of birth order effects, all families 
will not contribute to the estimation of all birth order effects. In particular, only large families 
can contribute to the high birth order effects. If birth order effects differ with family size, this 
will affect the pattern of birth order effects that we estimate. To deal with this we follow Black 
et al. (2005) and estimate separate regressions for each sibship size (2, 3, 4. 5 and 6). Note, 
however, that fertility might not be completed in all families, making the division into family 
sizes somewhat blurry.14,15  
                                                          
13 There are cases where there are more than one sibship in a household. Using household fixed effect does not 
qualitatively change our results, but since birth order is defined within the sibship, we use sibship fixed effects.  
14 We have also run sibship-size-specific estimations only for sibships whose size is at least as large as the 
mother’s expressed preferred number. This reduces the sample mostly for sibships of size 2, but to some degree 
also for sibships of size 3. The results of these estimations (not presented but available from the authors) are very 
similar to the results of estimations including also sibships whose size is smaller than the mother’s expressed 
preferred number of children. In addition we have run estimations only on the sample where the mother was at 
least 35 or at least 40 years. This reduces the sample substantially, and effects for test scores (which has the 
smallest sample sizes) are no longer significant. Otherwise results are similar to the main estimations. Results 
from these estimations are also available from the authors.  
15 The fact that fertility is not completed in all families is also a reason to use absolute birth order dummies rather 
than measures of relative birth order (see, for example Booth and Kee (2009) and Ejrnaes and Portner (2004)). 
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Along similar lines, families that do not use sex-selection contribute more to the identification 
of the female effect. These are likely either to have weaker son preferences or to more often use 
gender-specific fertility stopping rules to ensure the birth of a son. The estimated female effect 
will therefore differ from a hypothetical one where gender was truly random. However, it does 
still describe how girls are treated differently within families.  
To estimate a within-family model we need within-family variation in birth order in the 
estimation sample. Since the data on educational outcomes is restricted to an age-delimited 
subsample of children, our estimation sample could differ systematically from Indian families 
in general. However, the fact that we have a panel with 7 years in-between reduces this problem 
substantially. We lose very few observations to lack of within-family variation in birth order, 
even for test scores. Observed characteristics are extremely similar in our estimation sample 
and in a sample that also include observations from families without variation in birth order.16  
While the sibship fixed effects control for all time constant differences between families, they 
do not control for time-varying factors that vary systematically with birth order. The time-
varying controls included in the regressions are therefore important for the interpretation of 
birth order effects. Importantly we control for the survey year. This is crucial since within 
families higher birth order children will be school-age later, and thus face a different 
environment where schooling opportunities are likely to have improved (Barclay, 2018). Other 
time-varying differences that have been suggested to drive systematic birth order effects are 
credit constraints and maternal age and behaviors. The literature from developed countries has 
largely refuted the idea that systematic birth order effects are due to biological differences 
related to maternal age or behaviors during pregnancy. Systematic differences in credit 
constraints over time is, however, the main reason suggested to be behind birth order effects in 
developing countries. We therefore investigate the role of credit constraints in explaining birth 
order effects.  
In our main estimations we use linear sibship fixed effects regressions for all outcomes. For the 
binary outcomes, enrollment, child labor and private school we therefore estimate the linear 
probability model. We estimate alternative models as a robustness check (the conditional logit 
and the correlated random effects probit). Standard errors are always clustered at the sibship 
level. A well-known shortcoming of the fixed effects model is that attenuation bias due to 
                                                          
16 This comparison is available from the authors on request.  
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measurement error is amplified. Estimated birth order effects can therefore be viewed as lower 
bounds of the true ones. 
 
5. Main results  
Starting with the indicators of children’s current human capital stock (Table 2), the results show 
clear negative birth order effects across the board. The higher the birth order, the fewer grades 
she has completed, and the lower her scores on the reading-, writing- and math tests. In the case 
of education investment indicators (Table 3) the pattern is mixed. For private schooling and 
school expenses - the indicators of pecuniary investment into school quality - the pattern is the 
same as for human capital stock indicators: there are clear negative birth order effects. Time 
investment indicators show a different pattern, especially for child labor. While birth order 
effects on child labor are expected to have the opposite sign of those on education variables, 
our results show that birth order effects on child labor are strictly negative. Birth order effects 
are also negative for school enrolment and total hours, but there is a tendency towards non-
monotonic effects. Children of birth orders 4 to 6 do not appear to be disadvantaged in 
comparison to the first-born for enrolment. The difference in birth order effects on time 
investments compared to on pecuniary investments into school quality indicates that 
opportunity cost of child time could be influential. While negative birth order effects for both 
child labor and enrolment may seem counterintuitive, the two activities are not mutually 
exclusive: circa 48% of children participating in child labor are also enrolled in school. Further, 
participation in child labor is relatively low, at approximately 8% of the sample. 
Table 2: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock – 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math 
Second born -0.212*** -0.145*** -0.137*** -0.155*** 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.038) (0.033) 
Third born -0.376*** -0.255*** -0.214*** -0.285*** 
 (0.018) (0.062) (0.066) (0.057) 
Fourth to sixth 
borjborjbornborn born 
-0.475*** -0.339*** -0.346*** -0.428*** 
 (0.029) (0.096) (0.097) (0.086) 
Female 0.004 -0.059** -0.078*** -0.133*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 66,086 7,871 7,787 7,849 
Sibships 21,242 3,751 3,711 3,741 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table 3: The effect of birth order on educational investment-coefficients from linear sibship fixed 
effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private school School 
expenses 
Second born -0.028*** -0.007** -1.742*** -0.020*** -422.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.199) (0.004) (60.120) 
Third born -0.030*** -0.028*** -2.027*** -0.034*** -617.101*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.351) (0.008) (101.192) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.007 -0.060*** -1.163** -0.048*** -752.706*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.536) (0.012) (152.145) 
Female -0.029*** -0.020*** -1.394*** -0.056*** -548.329*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.138) (0.003) (38.323) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.15 
N 66,095 66,164 59,732 53,516 48,284 
Sibships 21,243 21,256 19,586 18,402 16,984 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Turning to gender differences, girls exhibit a human capital stock disadvantage in comparison 
to their brothers. They perform worse on the reading-, writing- and mathematics test. 
Nonetheless, there is one exception: girls are not disadvantaged in terms of the number of 
completed grades. Girls also receive less education investment than boys. They are less often 
enrolled, spend fewer hours on schooling, are less likely to attend a private school and have less 
money spent on their education. However, they are also less likely to participate in child labor. 
Unfortunately, we do not have information on domestic work, which is likely to be more 
common among girls. The fact that girls have completed as many grades as boys even though 
they are less likely to be enrolled means that they repeat grades less, and might be due to girls 
having been better provided with some unmeasured skill or ability which matters for academic 
success. 
Heterogeneous results across family size  
Tables 4 and 5 show family-size-specific birth order and gender effects. These estimations fill 
two purposes. First, heterogeneity related to family size is interesting in itself. Second, it can 
be seen as a robustness check, since all families do not contribute equally to all effects in the 
pooled sample.  
Negative birth order effects on human capital stock indicators are found across all family sizes 
(Table 4), though they are statistically insignificant for reading and writing test scores in 2-child 
families and for test scores in 6-child families. Turning to educational investment (Table 5), 
pecuniary investments into school quality also show a similar pattern. There are negative birth 
18 
 
order effects across all family sizes, although the effects are statistically weak for private 
schooling in many cases. In contrast, the effects of birth order on time investment differ across 
family sizes. In the largest families there seems to be more of a tradeoff between child work 
and education, and birth order effects follow the pattern found in other developing countries. In 
most family sizes there are no statistically significant birth order effects on enrolment or total 
hours, but there are negative ones for enrolment in 2-child families and for both enrolment and 
total hours  in 3-child families, and there are positive ones for both enrolment and total hours 
in 6-child families. Thus, the non-monotonic relationship between birth order and time 
investment into education is not present within given families. Instead, it appears to be driven 
by more negative birth order effects in small families and more positive ones in large families. 
Table 4: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of 
different sizes – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second born -0.260*** -0.137 -0.029 -0.234** 
 (0.021) (0.102) (0.111) (0.116) 
Female 0.046*** 0.073 -0.044 -0.060 
 (0.012) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) 
R2 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 
N 15,740 1,408 1,384 1,402 
Sibships 6,991 725 713 722 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second born -0.248*** -0.231*** -0.171** -0.192*** 
 (0.019) (0.065) (0.085) (0.070) 
Third born -0.535*** -0.411*** -0.260* -0.346*** 
 (0.036) (0.120) (0.157) (0.126) 
Female 0.034*** -0.014 -0.024 -0.076* 
 (0.011) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041) 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 
N 21,082 2,393 2,348 2,374 
Sibships 7,302 1,214 1,192 1,205 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second born -0.243*** -0.256*** -0.316*** -0.190** 
 (0.024) (0.085) (0.106) (0.085) 
Third born -0.504*** -0.440*** -0.521*** -0.371** 
 (0.040) (0.150) (0.189) (0.149) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.755*** -0.732*** -0.819*** -0.694*** 
(0.058) (0.228) (0.279) (0.223) 
Female -0.025 -0.096** -0.114** -0.166*** 
 (0.015) (0.047) (0.056) (0.050) 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
N 14,867 1,938 1,929 1,946 
Sibships 4,566 1,003 999 1,008 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second born -0.117*** -0.303*** -0.189* -0.223** 
 (0.033) (0.107) (0.110) (0.102) 
Third born -0.228*** -0.585*** -0.288* -0.531*** 
 (0.045) (0.161) (0.159) (0.155) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.410*** -0.702*** -0.422** -0.682*** 
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(0.065) (0.216) (0.205) (0.218) 
Female -0.060*** -0.141** -0.103 -0.197*** 
 (0.021) (0.064) (0.065) (0.061) 
R2 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05 
N 9,049 1,291 1,287 1,286 
Sibships 2,431 660 659 658 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second born -0.047 -0.137 0.096 0.178 
 (0.051) (0.223) (0.235) (0.182) 
Third born -0.151** -0.219 0.130 0.109 
 (0.063) (0.289) (0.291) (0.217) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.209** -0.235 0.060 -0.017 
(0.083) (0.336) (0.338) (0.253) 
Female -0.070** -0.261*** -0.136 -0.163** 
 (0.029) (0.088) (0.092) (0.074) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 
N 5,251 838 836 838 
Sibships 1,243 430 429 430 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 5: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second born -0.007 -0.015*** -1.355*** -0.017* -365.929** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.437) (0.009) (154.865) 
Female -0.001 -0.001 -0.036 -0.038*** -561.978*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.230) (0.006) (106.534) 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.19 
N 15,740 15,749 13,843 14,014 13,058 
Sibships 6,991 6,996 6,231 6,275 5,875 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second born -0.031*** -0.028*** -2.196*** -0.016* -562.978*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.384) (0.008) (114.971) 
Third born -0.040*** -0.052*** -3.297*** -0.023 -888.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.711) (0.014) (195.475) 
Female -0.022*** -0.014*** -1.232*** -0.059*** -586.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.228) (0.005) (62.944) 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.15 
N 21,084 21,100 19,082 17,547 15,939 
Sibships 7,303 7,308 6,740 6,281 5,770 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second born -0.007 -0.045*** -0.736 -0.011 -369.234*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.502) (0.011) (132.151) 
Third born -0.017 -0.065*** -1.088 -0.007 -812.563*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.810) (0.018) (260.133) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
-0.034 -0.066*** -1.885 -0.009 -897.056** 
(0.023) (0.019) (1.180) (0.025) (377.416) 
Female -0.043*** -0.027*** -1.969*** -0.061*** -486.332*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.309) (0.007) (58.814) 
R2 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.17 
N 14,870 14,884 13,575 11,604 10,315 
Sibships 4,566 4,567 4,272 3,839 3,466 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second born 0.020 -0.045*** 0.046 -0.030** -177.838 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.663) (0.014) (117.772) 
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Third born 0.022 -0.063*** -0.517 -0.056*** -420.343*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.860) (0.020) (119.799) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
0.032 -0.076*** -0.429 -0.057** -545.204*** 
(0.026) (0.022) (1.207) (0.028) (171.103) 
Female -0.048*** -0.033*** -1.951*** -0.062*** -460.207*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.405) (0.009) (69.333) 
R2 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.10 
N 9,053 9,075 8,301 6,554 5,709 
Sibships 2,431 2,434 2,285 1,987 1,758 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second born 0.025 -0.025 1.332 0.017 -129.963 
 (0.025) (0.020) (1.098) (0.026) (117.217) 
Third born 0.057** -0.056** 2.518* 0.001 -173.551 
 (0.028) (0.023) (1.301) (0.031) (176.769) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
0.058* -0.052* 2.658* -0.013 -443.359* 
(0.035) (0.028) (1.614) (0.037) (229.371) 
Female -0.061*** -0.031*** -2.560*** -0.068*** -397.073*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.564) (0.013) (95.478) 
R2 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.07 
N 5,251 5,258 4,856 3,718 3,192 
Sibships 1,243 1,243 1,190 1,040 930 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Girls are less disadvantaged in small families than in large families. In particular, girls in small 
families fare well in comparison to their brothers on the education related human capital stock 
indicators. In 2 and 3-child families girls have completed more grades than their brothers and 
they have similar test scores. In 4-child families, they have completed as many grades as their 
brothers but have worse test scores. In larger families, girls do worse than their brothers on all 
indicators. In terms of education investment (Table 5), girls are disadvantaged across all family 
sizes both with regard to pecuniary investment into school quality and with regard to time 
investment. The only exception is time investments in 2-child families. Hence, even if girls’ 
human capital stock appears to be at least as good as that of their brothers in small families, the 
families do not invest as much into the girls’ education. Finally, girls work less often in families 
of all sizes, but as mentioned earlier we do not have information on domestic work, which girls 
probably participate in more often.  
Gender – birth order interactions 
So far, we have constrained birth order effects to be the same for boys as for girls. However, 
costs and expected benefits of investing in child human capital are likely to differ between 
genders. In addition, these costs could interact with birth order differently across genders. For 
example, if child labor opportunities are better for boys than girls we might expect stronger 
birth order effects among brothers than among sisters for child labor, since credit constraints 
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interact with opportunity costs.  If oldest sons work on the land that they will inherit we should 
also expect strong birth order effects on child labor for boys but not for girls. In general, if labor 
market and schooling opportunities vary between the genders, birth order effects could also do 
so. Another reason for differing birth order effects between the genders could be oldest son 
preferences that play out differently for the genders, as explored in Jayachandran and Pande 
(2017) for early life outcomes. In short, oldest son preferences could create negative birth order 
effects among sons simply because the oldest son will be of a lower birth order. It will create 
negative birth order effects among girls if families continue childbearing until they have a son. 
The birth of a girl at birth orders at or above the desired total number of children will then 
increases expected family size, which can be expected to reduce in particular early life 
investment. Below, in table 6 and 7, we allow different birth order effects for boys than for 
girls. These results should be interpreted with caution since gender is not completely exogenous 
in India. They could still be descriptively interesting and potentially shed some light on possible 
reasons behind birth order effects. Tables A2-A3 show family size specific birth order effects 
that are allowed to vary across gender.   
Table 6: Gender specific birth order effects on indicators of current human capital stock – 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math 
Second born -0.200*** -0.123*** -0.109** -0.191*** 
 (0.013) (0.045) (0.050) (0.043) 
Third born -0.365*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.301*** 
 (0.021) (0.071) (0.077) (0.065) 
Fourth to sixth 
borjborjbornborn born 
-0.480*** -0.327*** -0.332*** -0.478*** 
 (0.031) (0.104) (0.106) (0.093) 
Female 0.016 -0.015 -0.047 -0.182*** 
 (0.013) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045) 
Second born * female -0.025 -0.044 -0.058 0.072 
 (0.017) (0.058) (0.066) (0.058) 
Third born * female -0.025 -0.110 -0.030 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.067) (0.075) (0.066) 
Fourth to sixth * female 0.010 -0.026 -0.027 0.096 
 (0.023) (0.074) (0.079) (0.070) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 
N 66,086 7,871 7,787 7,849 
Sibships 21,242 3,751 3,711 3,741 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 7: Gender specific birth order effects on educational investment-coefficients from linear sibship 
fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private school School expenses 
Second born -0.033*** -0.008* -1.923*** -0.022*** -421.800*** 
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 (0.005) (0.004) (0.255) (0.006) (79.054) 
Third born -0.032*** -0.029*** -2.071*** -0.029*** -643.182*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.398) (0.009) (122.761) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.010 -0.062*** -1.381** -0.043*** -733.407*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.577) (0.013) (165.896) 
Female -0.034*** -0.022*** -1.608*** -0.054*** -554.560*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.259) (0.006) (77.599) 
Second born * female 0.010 0.003 0.367 0.005 -0.240 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.342) (0.007) (95.271) 
Third born * female 0.004 0.002 0.076 -0.010 56.084 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.394) (0.008) (109.775) 
Fourth to sixth born * 
female 
0.006 0.003 0.435 -0.010 -36.623 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.441) (0.009) (111.974) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.15 
N 66,095 66,164 59,732 53,516 48,284 
Sibships 21,243 21,256 19,586 18,402 16,984 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
In general, birth order effects are similar for boys and for girls. In particular, we do not find 
differences in birth order effects between boys and girls for investment indicators (though all 
girls are at a disadvantage compared to boys of the same birth order). To investigate if negative 
birth order effects could still be driven by oldest son preferences, only with a similar impact 
among girls and among boys, we also followed Jayachandran and Pande (2017) in considering 
heterogeneity of birth order effects across places and families where son preferences could be 
expected to be stronger or weaker.  We ran various regressions where we interacted birth order 
indicators and other regressors with indicators of belonging to groups that could be argued to 
possess stronger or weaker son preferences (i.e., we ran fully interacted models): Hindu, living 
in Kerala, mothers’ reported desire to have more sons than daughters, mothers’ education, 
natural regional sex-ratios, and a high regional score on a ‘standing of women and children’ 
index in the state. Birth order effects do not seem to be systematically different in places where 
we have reason to expect weaker or stronger son preferences. Being a girl is worse in places 
and families where we should expect stronger son preferences, though. These regressions are 
not reported, but available from the authors on request. 
The family size specific estimations in tables A2-A3 show that birth order effects are indeed 
stronger among boys than girls in smaller families are. This could be due to better labor market 
opportunities among boys and/or that oldest sons in rural families work on land that they will 
inherit. There are also statistically significant gender*birth order interactions for completed 
grades in some family sizes. In particular, the oldest girl appears to do very well in small 
families. 
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Further robustness checks 
Table A4 in the appendix uses alternative samples for the estimations on some of the 
investments. The estimation of total school hours is conditional on any school hours, and the 
resulting birth order effects on conditional hours are clearly negative.  The estimations of the 
private school choice and expenses are not conditional on enrollment. The birth order effects in 
these cases are similar to in the estimations on conditional samples, but some of them are of a 
slightly smaller magnitude.  
Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix estimate the binary outcomes using the conditional logit 
model and the correlated random effects model. Results are similar to those in the main 
estimations. We have also run regressions using only the 2004 - 05 data, as the period between 
our two rounds witnessed a large expansion of schooling, including the coming in to force of 
the 2009 Right to Education Act. Though the test scores sample is too small for any meaningful 
inference, other results remain qualitatively similar to those in the main regressions. These 
results are available on request. Regressions with the time-varying household variable number 
of siblings are also available on request. The inclusion of this control variable does not affect 
the birth order and gender coefficients. 
6. Credit constraints and heterogeneous effects across family incomes 
Positive birth order effects on education outcomes in developing countries are typically 
explained by credit constraints and rising family income over time. In this section, we test 
whether the pattern of more negative birth order effects in richer families also holds in India. 
According to the simple model in section 3 we should expect credit constraints to be particularly 
important for time investment. Credit constraints matter for both pecuniary investment and time 
investment. However, for time investment credit constraints interact with opportunity cost of 
child time, which can be expected to vary systematically with birth order, with lower birth order 
(i.e. older) children expected to be more productive (Edmonds, 2006). For pecuniary costs, 
credit constraints interact with the price, which should not vary systematically by birth order.  
Tables 8 and 9 display results of fully interacted models, where household income per capita 
has been interacted with birth orders, the female dummy and the control variables (age fixed 
effects and survey year). To save space, Tables 8 and 9 only report the models estimated on the 
pooled sample of all sibship sizes. Sibship-size-specific estimations are presented in the 
appendix (Tables A7-A8).   
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on indicators of current human capital stock – coefficients 
from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income per capita 
 Completed 
Grade 
Reading Writing Math 
Second born -0.206*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.178*** 
 (0.012) (0.042) (0.049) (0.041) 
Third born -0.367*** -0.300*** -0.287*** -0.302*** 
 (0.021) (0.074) (0.081) (0.068) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.442*** -0.381*** -0.428*** -0.411*** 
 (0.031) (0.111) (0.116) (0.100) 
Female -0.031*** -0.129*** -0.105*** -0.190*** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029) 
Second born # Income per capita -0.007 0.428** 0.525* 0.225 
 (0.048) (0.207) (0.278) (0.218) 
Third born # Income per capita -0.137* 0.303 0.663 0.229 
 (0.077) (0.362) (0.445) (0.381) 
Fourth to sixth born # Income per capita -0.578*** 0.071 0.497 -0.171 
 (0.112) (0.493) (0.598) (0.484) 
Female # Income per Capita 0.254*** 0.601*** 0.240* 0.494*** 
 (0.040) (0.142) (0.143) (0.137) 
R2 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 
N 65,168 7,750 7,668 7,727 
Sibships 21,033 3,712 3,673 3,702 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, 
and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Birth order effects are indeed more negative in higher income per capita households for 
enrollment, educational expenses, and completed years. They are more negative among the poor 
for child labor. Birth order effects do not differ significantly between poor and rich families for 
the probability to attend a private school, and are if anything somewhat less negative for test 
scores. Larger effects on expenses among the rich than among the poor is a natural consequence 
of the fact that richer families afford to spend more. A regression using the share of school 
expenses out of total family school expenses have no statistically significant interaction effects 
(not reported but available from the authors). Hence, we do find a difference between poor and 
rich families for enrolment, child labor, and for completed grades, which is the human capital 
stock indicator that ought to be most connected to earlier time investment into education. 
However, the sibship-size-specific estimations in Table A7-A8 show that the pattern of negative 
interaction terms for time investments do not hold across different family sizes.17 Smaller 
families are more often relatively rich and larger ones more often poor. Thus, the differences 
between rich and poor families in the pooled sample might be driven more by heterogeneous 
effects across family size and less by heterogeneity due to income per se.   
 
                                                          
17 The only reasonably strong effects are for enrollment in 6-child families. 
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Table 9: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on educational investment-coefficients from linear sibship 
fixed effects models fully interacted with income per capita 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Second born -0.025*** -0.014*** -1.694*** -0.020*** -154.859 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.244) (0.005) (99.460) 
Third born -0.027*** -0.037*** -1.783*** -0.035*** -295.050* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.417) (0.009) (164.562) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.007 -0.075*** -1.032* -0.054*** -417.753* 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.618) (0.014) (225.525) 
Female -0.041*** -0.014*** -1.763*** -0.055*** -373.987*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.183) (0.004) (59.128) 
Second born # 
Income per capita 
-0.018 0.052*** 0.032 0.002 -2,108.107*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (1.073) (0.025) (733.022) 
Third born # Income 
per capita 
-0.047* 0.094*** -2.936 0.016 -2,762.444** 
(0.027) (0.026) (1.963) (0.047) (1,191.175) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# Income per capita 
-0.086** 0.189*** -4.852* 0.087 -2,370.674* 
(0.041) (0.038) (2.629) (0.063) (1,415.250) 
Female # Income per 
capita 
0.086*** -0.034*** 2.664*** -0.000 -1,207.736** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.807) (0.019) (487.938) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.20 
N 65,177 65,246 58,914 52,758 47,585 
Sibships 21,034 21,047 19,372 18,216 16,805 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
In Tables 10 and 11 we restrict the estimation sample to the rural poor. In this sample credit 
constraints can be expected to be particularly severe and opportunity cost of child time is likely 
to be higher in rural than urban areas. The aim is to investigate if birth order effects are more in 
line with previous developing country results in this restricted sample. The birth order effects 
on human capital stock indicators are negative and at least as large among the rural poor as in 
the all India sample. The birth order effects on educational investments also resemble those in 
the full sample. There are, however, stronger effects on child labor in the rural poor sample, 
and child labor is also more common in this sample. The birth order effects on enrolment and 
private schooling are weak or insignificant, and the effect on total hours does not exhibit the 
same non-monotonic properties as in the main specification. 
Table 10: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock among the rural 
poor– coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 
Completed 
Grades Reading Writing Math 
Second born -0.188*** -0.265*** -0.257*** -0.238*** 
 (0.027) (0.091) (0.096) (0.078) 
Third born -0.347*** -0.423*** -0.352** -0.409*** 
 (0.047) (0.163) (0.167) (0.129) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.484*** -0.597** -0.689*** -0.769*** 
 (0.073) (0.250) (0.241) (0.195) 
Female -0.077*** -0.162*** -0.085 -0.174*** 
 (0.018) (0.055) (0.063) (0.052) 
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R2 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 
N 12,254 1,723 1,707 1,720 
Sibships 4,251 940 931 939 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 11: The effect of birth order on educational investment among the rural poor - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Second born -0.016 -0.034*** -1.324*** -0.013* -155.679*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.462) (0.007) (34.454) 
Third born -0.020 -0.048*** -1.905** -0.017 -217.526*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.780) (0.012) (63.283) 
Fourth to sixth -0.024 -0.077*** -2.526** -0.028 -278.269*** 
Born (0.027) (0.021) (1.168) (0.017) (101.434) 
Female -0.056*** -0.015** -2.038*** -0.029*** -87.483*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.330) (0.006) (26.278) 
R2 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.17 
N 12,257 12,278 11,209 9,060 8,014 
Sibships 4,251 4,253 3,926 3,502 3,124 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship 
fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have investigated within-household inequalities in human capital accumulation in India. In 
doing so, we have considered both indicators of the child’s current stock of human capital and 
of investment into their continued human capital accumulation, distinguishing between time 
investments and pecuniary investment into school quality. A simple model highlight the 
difference between time investment and pecuniary investment. For time investment, credit 
constraints interact with opportunity cost of child time, which can be expected to vary 
systematically with birth order. For pecuniary investment, credit constraints interact with the 
price, which should not vary systematically with birth order.  
Overall, our results show that the effects of birth order on human capital are generally negative 
in India. They also demonstrate that the type of human capital measure examined is important. 
Birth order effects on current stock of human capital as well as on pecuniary investment are 
negative, which is in line with the results from developed countries. The results for time 
investments into human capital are, however, more in line with previous studies from 
developing countries. Later-born children are less often child laborers. Later-born children also 
have an enrolment advantage in the largest families.  
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Positive birth order effects in developing countries are typically explained by credit constraints. 
Our results suggest that credit constraints might be important for time investment, for which 
opportunity cost of child time is important. For these outcomes, birth order effects are more 
negative in richer households. However, our results do not indicate that credit constraints are 
important in general and alone in India. First, pecuniary investments should also be affected by 
credit constraints, but not by opportunity cost of child time. However, birth order effects are 
consistently negative for pecuniary investment into school quality and for human capital stock 
indicators. This is true even among the rural poor, where we would expect credit constraints to 
be most important. Second, household income does not appear to influence the birth order 
effects on pecuniary investment and human capital stocks, except for completed grades, which 
is the human capital stock indicator most closely connected to earlier time investments. Finally, 
it is not certain that income influences birth order effects on time investment when we condition 
on sibship size. Income is correlated with family size. Thus, differences in effects by family 
size rather than by income may be driving the differences in birth order effects across rich and 
poor families, in this as well as in other studies from developing countries. 
Much of the previous research on birth order and education in developing countries has focused 
on outcomes related to time investment, primarily enrollment and child labor (De Haan et al, 
2014; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010). Our results for these outcomes indicate that credit 
constraints are generally not sufficiently binding to cause positive birth order effects. This is 
interesting, as India is on average a poorer country than Ecuador, for example. It could be the 
case that credit constraints do not play as decisive a role in India with respect to educational 
investments because the pecuniary costs of (early) schooling are relatively low, given the 
widespread availability of primary schools (Kingdon, 2007; Oxfam India, 2018). We can 
however only speculate on this front.    
The negative birth order effects on pecuniary investments could be interpreted as parents 
choosing to invest in the most able children. The return to further education investment is likely 
to be higher for children who already possess more human capital.  Lower birth order children 
have better test scores and grade completion. This could be interpreted as greater accumulated 
human capital stock. However, these variables are clearly not only measures of the child human 
capital stock, i.e. of the child’s abilities. They are also outcomes of previous human capital 
investments, and there is no reason to assume that abilities should be systematically correlated 
with birth order for natural reasons. Indeed, the developed country evidence suggests that the 
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advantage of first-born is not due to biological reasons (Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2010; 
Barclay, 2015).  
Turning to gender, girls are generally disadvantaged within the family. An outcome that 
deviates from the overall pattern of female disadvantage is completed grades, where all girls on 
average do well in comparison to brothers. In most estimations the female dummy does not 
have a statistically significant coefficient. We can only speculate as to the reasons, but one 
possibility is that girls are more motivated to perform well at school. They have more direct 
control over the amount of effort they exert, compared with other investments that are (mostly) 
controlled by parents. It could also be related to other non-cognitive skills which girls for some 
reason are better provided with; for example orderliness, time management, diligence, 
responsibility, etc. 
To sum up, birth order effects on education in India broadly follow the same pattern that has 
been found in developed rather than developing countries. Child opportunity cost of time, 
however, appears to matter. As a result, birth order effects follow the typical developing country 
pattern for time investments. This is especially the case in large families. Reasons for negative 
birth order effects are probably the same ones which create negative birth order effects in 
developed countries. Pure dilution of parental resources might be one explanation. Another 
possibility is that the disease environment at home is negatively affected by more children. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics per sibship size, dependent variables. 
 N Mean Std dev Min Max 
2 siblings      
Enrollment 15,740 0.951 0.217 0.000 1.000 
Child Labor 15,749 0.039 0.194 0.000 1.000 
Total hours spent on school in 
a week 13,843 42.648 17.068 0.000 216.000 
Private school 14,014 0.402 0.491 0.000 1.000 
School expenses in rupees 13,058 5165.810 8255.481 0.000 201000.000 
Completed grades 15,740 5.057 3.149 0.000 16.000 
Reading test score 1,408          3.001 1.150 0.000 4.000 
Writing test score 1,384 0.845 0.362 0.000 1.000 
Math test score 1,402 1.866 0.901 0.000 3.000 
3 siblings     
Enrollment 21,084 0.895 0.306 0.000 1.000 
Child Labor 21,100 0.077 0.266 0.000 1.000 
Total hours spent on school in 
a week 19,082 38.400 18.114 0.000 180.000 
Private school 17,547 0.301 0.459 0.000 1.000 
School expenses in rupees 15,939 3012.366 5872.831 0.000 175800.000 
Completed grades 21,082 4.963 3.221 0.000 15.000 
Reading test score 2,393 2.725 1.294 0.000 4.000 
Writing test score 2,348 0.751 0.433 0.000 1.000 
Math test score 2,374 1.5897 0.975 0.000 3.000 
4 siblings      
Enrollment 14,870 0.839 0.3678 0.000 1.000 
Child Labor 14,884 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 
Total hours spent on school in 
a week 13,575 34.477 19.266 0.000 121.000 
Private school 11,604 0.248 0.432 0.000 1.000 
School expenses in rupees 10,315 2108.404 3833.421 0.000 85800.000 
Completed grades 14,867 4.652 3.187 0.000 14.000 
Reading test score 1,938 2.477 1.370 0.000 4.000 
Writing test score 1,929 0.680 0.467 0.000 1.000 
Math test score 1,946 1.452 1.031 0.000 3.000 
5 siblings      
Enrollment 9,053 0.778 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Child Labor 9,075 0.124 0.329 0.000 1.000 
Total hours spent on school in 
a week 8,301 31.222 20.334 0.000 110.000 
Private school 6,554 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000 
School expenses in rupees 5,709 1684.724 3204.986 0.000 99000.000 
Completed grades 9,049 4.211 3.169 0.000 15.000 
Reading test score 1,291 2.203 1.413 0.000 4.000 
Writing test score 1,287 0.614 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Math test score 1,286 1.230 0.970 0.000 3.000 
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6 siblings      
Enrollment 5,251 0.757 0.429051 0 1 
Child Labor 5,258 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Total hours spent on school in 
a week 4,856 29.709 20.364 0 130 
Private school 3,718 0.218 0.413 0 1 
School expenses in rupees 3,192 1518.407 3243.095 0 104000 
Completed grades 5,251 4.066 3.150 0 15 
Reading test score 838 1.958 1.466 0 4 
Writing test score 836 0.567 0.496 0 1 
Math test score 838 1.118 0.976 0 3 
 
Table A2: Gender specific birth order effects on indicators of current human capital stock in 
families of different sizes – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed grades Reading Writing Math 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second born -0.234*** -0.149 -0.000 -0.266** 
 (0.024) (0.110) (0.117) (0.120) 
Female 0.081*** 0.056 -0.001 -0.106 
 (0.020) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) 
Female*2nd born -0.071** 0.035 -0.087 0.094 
 (0.031) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) 
R2 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 
N 15,740 1,408 1,384 1,402 
Sibships 6,991 725 713 722 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second born -0.208*** -0.275*** -0.182* -0.211*** 
 (0.024) (0.077) (0.101) (0.081) 
Third born -0.506*** -0.427*** -0.231 -0.361*** 
 (0.039) (0.125) (0.167) (0.133) 
Female 0.084*** -0.059 -0.004 -0.103 
 (0.021) (0.074) (0.088) (0.077) 
Female*3rd born -0.079*** 0.091 0.016 0.041 
 (0.027) (0.093) (0.113) (0.096) 
Female*4th born -0.064** 0.021 -0.098 0.036 
 (0.031) (0.116) (0.127) (0.113) 
R2 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.03 
N 21,082 2,393 2,348 2,374 
Sibships 7,302 1,214 1,192 1,205 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second born -0.220*** -0.170 -0.296** -0.169 
 (0.036) (0.116) (0.144) (0.126) 
Third born -0.497*** -0.374** -0.531** -0.407** 
 (0.048) (0.176) (0.218) (0.177) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.786*** -0.753*** -0.799*** -0.771*** 
(0.064) (0.245) (0.293) (0.237) 
Female -0.032 -0.062 -0.093 -0.233** 
 (0.035) (0.112) (0.138) (0.117) 
Female*2nd born -0.036 -0.127 -0.036 -0.023 
 (0.042) (0.130) (0.158) (0.141) 
Female*3rd born -0.010 -0.088 0.012 0.085 
 (0.043) (0.139) (0.168) (0.145) 
Female*4th born 0.080* 0.137 -0.061 0.215 
 (0.048) (0.160) (0.193) (0.164) 
R2 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
N 14,867 1,938 1,929 1,946 
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Sibships 4,566 1,003 999 1,008 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second born -0.093* -0.173 -0.152 -0.253 
 (0.054) (0.190) (0.193) (0.166) 
Third born -0.205*** -0.412* -0.359 -0.517** 
 (0.063) (0.226) (0.225) (0.204) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.457*** -0.596** -0.397 -0.732*** 
(0.078) (0.264) (0.250) (0.254) 
Female -0.078 0.052 -0.105 -0.237 
 (0.058) (0.198) (0.200) (0.189) 
Female*2nd born -0.045 -0.211 -0.059 0.044 
 (0.068) (0.236) (0.258) (0.215) 
Female*3rd born -0.044 -0.285 0.129 -0.030 
 (0.068) (0.233) (0.254) (0.219) 
Female*4th – 5th 
born 
0.082 -0.174 -0.039 0.083 
(0.065) (0.221) (0.223) (0.207) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 
N 9,049 1,291 1,287 1,286 
Sibships 2,431 660 659 658 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second born -0.117 0.164 0.275 0.487 
 (0.080) (0.312) (0.421) (0.348) 
Third born -0.290*** -0.044 0.351 0.378 
 (0.092) (0.363) (0.451) (0.340) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.399*** -0.199 0.021 0.046 
(0.101) (0.375) (0.499) (0.378) 
Female -0.310*** -0.156 -0.096 0.005 
 (0.096) (0.421) (0.521) (0.400) 
Female*2nd born 0.108 -0.473 -0.290 -0.481 
 (0.109) (0.454) (0.498) (0.430) 
Female*3rd born 0.222* -0.258 -0.352 -0.409 
 (0.114) (0.468) (0.531) (0.413) 
Female*4th – 6th 
born 
0.304*** -0.019 0.081 -0.063 
(0.100) (0.421) (0.531) (0.413) 
R2 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 
N 5,251 838 836 838 
Sibships 1,243 430 429 430 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table A3: Gender specific birth order effects on educational investment in families of different sizes - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second 
born 
-0.009 -0.021*** -1.212*** -0.015 -247.107 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.464) (0.010) (165.128) 
Female -0.003 -0.009* 0.157 -0.036*** -403.306*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.360) (0.009) (151.549) 
Female*2nd 
born 
0.005 0.015* -0.390 -0.005 -320.281 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.577) (0.013) (211.627) 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.19 
N 15,740 15,749 13,843 14,014 13,058 
Sibships 6,991 6,996 6,231 6,275 5,875 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second 
born 
-0.033*** -0.041*** -2.141*** -0.027*** -514.151*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.474) (0.010) (147.072) 
Third born -0.043*** -0.066*** -3.313*** -0.032** -906.248*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.757) (0.016) (217.669) 
Female -0.027*** -0.034*** -1.210*** -0.074*** -572.165*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.430) (0.009) (125.974) 
Female*2nd 
born 
0.006 0.027*** -0.108 0.024** -92.193 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.544) (0.011) (168.090) 
Female*3rd 
born 
0.007 0.033*** 0.060 0.020 67.430 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.638) (0.013) (199.393) 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.15 
N 21,084 21,100 19,082 17,547 15,939 
Sibships 7,303 7,308 6,740 6,281 5,770 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second 
born 
0.002 -0.056*** -0.950 -0.022 -442.333*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.720) (0.015) (158.587) 
Third born -0.016 -0.083*** -1.560 -0.011 -922.856*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.963) (0.020) (286.202) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
-0.035 -0.092*** -2.307* -0.009 -815.677** 
(0.025) (0.022) (1.279) (0.027) (374.034) 
Female -0.040*** -0.055*** -2.513*** -0.066*** -506.835*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.714) (0.015) (114.950) 
Female*2nd 
born 
-0.014 0.019 0.365 0.017 111.989 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.848) (0.018) (135.023) 
Female*3rd 
born 
-0.001 0.031* 0.835 0.007 180.717 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.860) (0.018) (147.165) 
Female*4th 
– 6th born 
0.005 0.053*** 0.819 -0.004 -254.901 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.951) (0.020) (166.665) 
R2 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.17 
N 14,870 14,884 13,575 11,604 10,315 
Sibships 4,566 4,567 4,272 3,839 3,466 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second 
born 
0.013 -0.053** -0.657 -0.031 -91.435 
(0.023) (0.022) (1.034) (0.024) (153.196) 
Third born 0.013 -0.084*** -0.959 -0.047* -370.078** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (1.171) (0.028) (167.822) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
-0.002 -0.100*** -2.385* -0.063* -499.008** 
(0.031) (0.028) (1.416) (0.035) (226.670) 
Female -0.077*** -0.060*** -3.709*** -0.064** -384.414** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (1.153) (0.027) (193.441) 
Female*2nd 
born 
0.008 0.012 1.012 0.000 -136.850 
(0.029) (0.027) (1.340) (0.031) (190.693) 
Female*3rd 
born 
0.011 0.032 0.506 -0.015 -76.753 
(0.029) (0.026) (1.361) (0.030) (187.294) 
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Female*4th 
– 6th born 
0.056** 0.039 3.231** 0.011 -69.374 
(0.028) (0.025) (1.293) (0.029) (251.675) 
R2 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.10 
N 9,053 9,075 8,301 6,554 5,709 
Sibships 2,431 2,434 2,285 1,987 1,758 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second 
born 
0.003 -0.033 0.138 0.009 -296.576 
(0.040) (0.036) (1.847) (0.044) (235.692) 
Third born 0.006 -0.070* -0.076 -0.001 -234.549 
 (0.042) (0.038) (1.901) (0.047) (280.251) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
-0.006 -0.074* -0.572 -0.012 -367.431 
(0.045) (0.038) (2.030) (0.051) (262.584) 
Female -0.143*** -0.058 -6.708*** -0.069 -365.148* 
 (0.045) (0.041) (2.045) (0.052) (208.893) 
Female*2nd 
born 
0.034 0.012 1.819 0.015 274.445 
(0.052) (0.047) (2.364) (0.053) (275.212) 
Female*3rd 
born 
0.081 0.022 4.094* 0.002 102.416 
(0.053) (0.046) (2.384) (0.057) (276.672) 
Female*4th 
– 6th born 
0.103** 0.035 5.188** -0.001 -122.748 
(0.047) (0.041) (2.131) (0.053) (262.401) 
R2 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.07 
N 5,251 5,258 4,856 3,718 3,192 
Sibships 1,243 1,243 1,190 1,040 930 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
 
Table A4: The effect of birth order and gender on educational investments with 
alternative samples - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Hours 
(sample conditional 
on any hours) 
Private school 
(unconditional 
sample) 
Expenses 
(unconditional 
sample) 
Second born -0.666*** -0.016*** -379.885*** 
 (0.126) (0.004) (48.777) 
Third born -1.154*** -0.024*** -465.859*** 
 (0.234) (0.007) (79.001) 
Fourth to sixth born -1.494*** -0.028*** -481.876*** 
 (0.359) (0.010) (119.614) 
Female -0.104 -0.055*** -498.936*** 
 (0.075) (0.003) (32.783) 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.11 
N 49,172 63,621 58,165 
Sibships 17,170 20,610 19,301 
 
Table A5: The effect of birth order and gender on binary outcome investments – marginal 
effects from the conditional logit model 
 Enrolment Child labor Private school 
Second born -0.007 -0.064*** -0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) 
Third born -0.002 -0.103*** -0.064*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.020 -0.136*** -0.094*** 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) 
Female -0.076*** -0.043*** -0.146*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
N 18,903 13,951 12,670 
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Table A6: The effect of birth order and gender on binary outcome investments – coefficients 
from the correlated random effects model 
 Enrolment Child labor Private school 
Second born -0.002 -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Third born 0.006 -0.023*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.022*** -0.033*** -0.021** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
Female -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.052*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
N 65,284 65,352 52,805 
 
 
Table A7: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different sizes 
– coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second born -0.261*** -0.044 -0.065 -0.194 
 (0.026) (0.144) (0.155) (0.160) 
Female 0.036** 0.015 -0.044 -0.154** 
 (0.017) (0.064) (0.068) (0.066) 
Second born # income 
 
-0.021 -0.438 0.052 -0.146 
(0.069) (0.404) (0.382) (0.504) 
Female # income 0.041 0.277 -0.005 0.459** 
 (0.049) (0.174) (0.177) (0.206) 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 
N 15,466 1,387 1,363 1,381 
Sibships 6,900 716 704 713 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second born -0.244*** -0.233*** -0.179* -0.224** 
 (0.022) (0.081) (0.105) (0.092) 
Third born -0.519*** -0.468*** -0.247 -0.393** 
 (0.040) (0.150) (0.194) (0.167) 
Female 0.003 -0.081 -0.034 -0.122** 
 (0.015) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) 
Second born -0.044 0.129 -0.053 0.365 
# income (0.089) (0.440) (0.410) (0.540) 
Third born -0.092 0.606 -0.339 0.576 
# income (0.151) (0.796) (0.735) (0.985) 
Female 0.222*** 0.579** 0.070 0.487 
# income (0.073) (0.284) (0.275) (0.321) 
R2 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 
N 20,781 2,346 2,304 2,327 
Sibships 7,220 1,193 1,172 1,184 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second born -0.260*** -0.307*** -0.428*** -0.185* 
 (0.030) (0.106) (0.135) (0.108) 
Third born -0.523*** -0.382** -0.565** -0.303 
 (0.047) (0.186) (0.242) (0.189) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.746*** -0.548* -0.761** -0.451 
(0.067) (0.279) (0.354) (0.281) 
Female -0.059*** -0.216*** -0.234*** -0.234*** 
 (0.021) (0.064) (0.076) (0.065) 
Second born  0.106 0.658 2.119** -0.009 
# income (0.175) (0.875) (0.989) (0.956) 
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Third born 0.062 -0.583 1.927 -0.750 
# income (0.239) (1.523) (1.886) (1.622) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
-0.135 -1.825 1.705 -2.308 
(0.325) (2.084) (2.598) (2.176) 
Female  
# income 
0.313** 1.300*** 1.255*** 0.685 
(0.134) (0.491) (0.482) (0.438) 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
N 14,717 1,913 1,904 1,921 
Sibships 4,526 991 987 996 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second born -0.142*** -0.295** -0.187 -0.199 
 (0.043) (0.138) (0.144) (0.129) 
Third born -0.253*** -0.537** -0.378* -0.592*** 
 (0.057) (0.209) (0.211) (0.192) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.424*** -0.600** -0.541* -0.867*** 
(0.081) (0.286) (0.296) (0.277) 
Female -0.103*** -0.152* -0.107 -0.208** 
 (0.027) (0.088) (0.095) (0.089) 
Second born  0.170 0.108 -0.125 -0.601 
# income (0.374) (1.088) (1.217) (1.061) 
Third born  0.011 -0.295 1.072 0.889 
# income (0.444) (1.722) (1.670) (1.563) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
-0.066 -1.098 1.182 2.561 
(0.553) (2.704) (2.460) (2.694) 
Female 0.504*** 0.187 0.054 0.109 
# income (0.190) (0.733) (0.805) (0.858) 
R2 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.05 
N 8,922 1,275 1,271 1,270 
Sibships 2,403 654 653 652 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second born -0.107* -0.145 0.403** 0.139 
 (0.062) (0.208) (0.189) (0.206) 
Third born -0.241*** -0.322 0.572* 0.280 
 (0.079) (0.324) (0.312) (0.282) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.251** -0.374 0.450 0.177 
(0.103) (0.372) (0.346) (0.312) 
Female -0.135*** -0.357*** -0.115 -0.157 
 (0.040) (0.118) (0.139) (0.122) 
Second born # income 0.677 -1.044 -4.532* 0.098 
 (0.641) (2.254) (2.469) (2.114) 
Third born # income 1.069 1.704 -7.568* -4.269 
 (0.780) (4.756) (4.454) (4.048) 
Fourth to sixth born  
# income 
0.206 2.219 -6.874* -4.021 
(0.964) (4.180) (3.742) (3.673) 
Female # income 0.865*** 1.532 0.173 -0.173 
 (0.321) (1.253) (1.377) (1.210) 
R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 
N 5,186 826 823 825 
Sibships 1,232 426 425 426 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table A8: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Second born -0.004 -0.018*** -1.714*** -0.018 -50.249 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.573) (0.012) (259.004) 
Female -0.003 0.004 -0.213 -0.035*** -634.439*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.343) (0.008) (159.879) 
Second born # income -0.016 0.015 1.580 0.008 -1,467.361 
 (0.018) (0.019) (1.793) (0.041) (1,165.213) 
Female # income 0.017 -0.027** 1.023 -0.018 280.570 
(0.012) (0.012) (1.032) (0.026) (889.029) 
R2 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.23 
N 15,466 15,475 13,601 13,760 12,819 
Sibships 6,900 6,905 6,147 6,191 5,794 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Second born -0.031*** -0.032*** -2.340*** -0.025** -178.452 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.487) (0.010) (247.070) 
Third born -0.037** -0.058*** -3.432*** -0.041** -524.921 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.887) (0.019) (367.782) 
Female -0.034*** -0.005 -1.630*** -0.055*** -220.965** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.322) (0.007) (88.709) 
Second born # income 0.003 0.037 1.604 0.075 -2,788.891 
 (0.032) (0.034) (2.144) (0.052) (1,987.483) 
Third born # income -0.001 0.037 2.518 0.129 -2,549.724 
 (0.053) (0.054) (3.994) (0.097) (2,582.913) 
Female # income 0.072*** -0.051** 2.273 -0.028 -2,672.345*** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (1.619) (0.036) (731.564) 
R2 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.20 
N 20,783 20,799 18,812 17,297 15,706 
Sibships 7,221 7,226 6,662 6,211 5,702 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Second born -0.015 -0.052*** -1.343** -0.026* -474.626** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.614) (0.013) (188.409) 
Third born -0.034* -0.074*** -1.868* -0.028 -652.960** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.970) (0.022) (299.037) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.054** -0.080*** -3.144** -0.037 -960.902** 
(0.026) (0.022) (1.391) (0.032) (448.205) 
Female -0.058*** -0.022*** -2.573*** -0.063*** -327.528*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.424) (0.009) (107.748) 
Second born # income 0.064 0.112* 5.083 0.184* 1,567.119 
 (0.068) (0.066) (3.786) (0.097) (1,791.615) 
Third born # income 0.142 0.154* 6.321 0.283* -521.024 
 (0.092) (0.093) (5.724) (0.164) (2,317.356) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
0.183 0.187 11.129 0.362* 1,287.366 
(0.122) (0.128) (7.865) (0.218) (3,174.479) 
Female # income 0.152*** -0.031 6.209** 0.044 -1,268.485 
 (0.052) (0.048) (2.937) (0.061) (1,141.595) 
R2 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.23 
N 14,720 14,734 13,440 11,483 10,205 
Sibships 4,526 4,527 4,236 3,804 3,435 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Second born 0.033* -0.041** 0.479 -0.006 -58.968 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.804) (0.018) (143.963) 
Third born 0.024 -0.049** -0.198 -0.033 -298.872* 
 (0.024) (0.021) (1.093) (0.024) (166.091) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.035 -0.058** -0.038 -0.044 -381.679 
(0.033) (0.029) (1.560) (0.035) (252.969) 
Female -0.058*** -0.009 -2.156*** -0.051*** -246.204*** 
40 
 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.507) (0.011) (90.049) 
Second born # income -0.220* -0.007 -6.424 -0.296* -1,269.271 
 (0.118) (0.135) (5.204) (0.178) (1,526.693) 
Third born # income -0.074 -0.094 -4.427 -0.231 -1,599.266 
 (0.170) (0.149) (7.727) (0.211) (1,741.891) 
Fourth to sixth born  
# income 
-0.096 -0.162 -5.895 -0.125 -2,073.178 
(0.219) (0.200) (10.631) (0.274) (2,299.350) 
Female # income 0.133* -0.283*** 2.239 -0.107 -2,169.556** 
 (0.069) (0.073) (3.454) (0.089) (1,021.370) 
R2 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.12 
N 8,926 8,948 8,183 6,467 5,629 
Sibships 2,403 2,406 2,258 1,963 1,738 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Second born 0.048 -0.022 2.324* 0.003 -364.957 
 (0.030) (0.024) (1.305) (0.029) (271.535) 
Third born 0.089** -0.076*** 3.662** 0.012 -421.698 
 (0.036) (0.029) (1.597) (0.037) (295.370) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.088** -0.069** 3.698* -0.027 -742.373* 
(0.044) (0.035) (2.030) (0.046) (402.042) 
Female -0.081*** -0.016 -2.908*** -0.073*** -248.904 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.697) (0.017) (165.871) 
Second born  -0.552** 0.136 -20.142* 0.230 3,394.773 
# income (0.249) (0.194) (11.842) (0.285) (3,488.353) 
Third born  -0.717** 0.533** -22.455* -0.145 3,283.586 
# income (0.312) (0.228) (13.606) (0.300) (3,505.931) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
-0.685* 0.504* -21.276 0.196 3,356.170 
(0.360) (0.258) (17.349) (0.353) (4,484.245) 
Female 0.268*** -0.176* 5.521 0.081 -1,860.610 
# income (0.099) (0.096) (4.948) (0.153) (2,069.500) 
R2 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.08 
N 5,186 5,193 4,803 3,673 3,156 
Sibships 1,232 1,232 1,181 1,030 922 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
